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No longer Singaporean 
Susan Leong 
Department of Media & Communication, QUT, Brisbane, Australia. 
 
From communal politics and internet governance to language policies, the tiny speck that is 
Singapore is known for doing things its own way, with an innovative if patriarchal 
government kneading a hungry, migrant mass into one of the most well disciplined, efficient 
and diligent working populations in Southeast Asia. Much has also been made of its success at 
multiculturalism though some, like sociologist Chua Beng Huat argue it to be multiracialism. 
Using Chua’s argument as a platform for departure, and taking a cue from Stratton’s notion of 
‘everyday multiculturalism’ I argue through a reflexive exploration of Singapore as a lived 
experience, that rather than conflict, the two theories complement each other with the former 
paving the way for the latter. 
 





In early 1998 when my family migrated to Australia from Singapore, an Anglo-
Australian related through marriage pointedly asked us: ‘are you going to assimilate?’ 
With the earnestness of new migrants somewhat cowed by the Hansonite rhetoric of 
that period, the answer then was an enthusiastic ‘yes’. Our experiences since have 
proven that reply premature, not least because the reality of migrant resettlement is 
much more complex than the question allowed. This paper, then, is a belated attempt 
to respond to that query more fully, as informed and evoked by a 2009 trip to 
Singapore to visit family.  
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According to Chua (2005, 4), race is explicitly addressed in Singapore through 
the instrument of its Constitution, which recognises and defines the nation as 
multiracial and comprised of three main racial categories: Chinese, Malay and Indian. 
He argues that though couched predominantly as cultural policy, ‘official 
multiracialism’ also disempowers the concept of race in order to utilise its 
categorisations and assumed norms as ‘policies of social control’ (2005, 1; 1998, 34). 
I will not repeat Chua’s arguments here as for the most part I concur that race has 
been appropriated with great expertise by the government of Singapore during the 
course of its uninterrupted rule since independence.1 The logic of multiracialism is 
deeply ingrained in Singapore and often enacted as well as co-opted into the 
hegemonic discourse of economic progress via discriminatory policies.  
Race looms large in the Singaporean imaginary as racial categories play the 
crucial role of structuring much of national policy as well as everyday life. An 
instance of this can be seen in the quota system designed to balance the racial 
composition of residents of every HDB (Housing Development Board) estate so as, 
ostensibly, to reflect the racial demographics of the nation and prevent the formation 
of ethnic enclaves (Chua 2005, 7). The same categorical understanding of race is 
evinced in the education system where school children selecting a ‘mother tongue’ as 
part of the language curriculum are confined to a specific range based on the origins 
associated with their race (PuruShotam 1998, 89-91).2 Similarly, within meritocratic 
Singapore, those who fail to make the cut or fall by the wayside of socio-economic 
progress must look primarily to their racial/cultural associations and self-help bodies 
for assistance, not the State. Unsurprisingly, everyday existence in Singapore is 
sharply delineated along racial lines, marked by a high level of anxiety over financial 
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and educational goals, and preoccupied by individual material consumption power 
and success (Chua 1998, 33).  
Yet, in Race Daze (1998, 15), Stratton makes positive comparisons between 
the ‘everyday multiculturalism’ of Singapore and the ‘official multiculturalism’ of 
Australia. The latter, he argues, ‘suppresses the continued hegemony of Anglo-Celtic 
Australian culture by making it invisible’ (Stratton and Ang 1994). Conversely, 
‘everyday multiculturalism’, as enacted in Singapore, is a process whereby ‘cultures, 
creolise and transform as people live their lives, adapting to and resisting situations, 
and (mis)understanding, loving, hating and taking pleasure in other people with whom 
they come into contact’. For Stratton, it is precisely because Singapore has no 
‘perceived core culture’ (1998, 34–40, 202) but a ‘tripartite racial/cultural structure’ 
that a ‘syncretic, composite culture’ has developed (1998, 202–3).  
On the surface the two theories on race and culture in Singapore—official 
multiracialism and everyday multiculturalism as conceived by Chua and Stratton 
respectively—seem to contradict each other. However, I argue that not to be the case 
and suggest some value is to be gained from a study of the Singaporean ethos through 
both lenses. Hence, while I agree with what Chua writes of official multiracialism in 
Singapore I also want here to flesh out some of what Stratton alludes to, through a 
reflexive exploration of Singapore as a lived experience. In so doing, I contend that it 
is precisely because official multiracialism governs the structure of Singaporean 
society both naturalising and compelling its people into State-determined racial 
categories that it paves the way for everyday multiculturalism. To be clear, however, 
this is not to imply that the existence of everyday multiculturalism justifies 
Singapore’s inequitable, race-based public housing and language education policies.   
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Singapore: as Lived Experience 
A few years into life in Australia, I was present when a keynote speaker at a 
conference declared himself not Chinese but specifically and unequivocally 
Singaporean. I was struck by his adamant assertion, but not being game to quiz him 
further, had to contend to live with it then. However, during the recent 
aforementioned trip to Singapore, that unanswered query returned to pique me again. 
This was especially acute after the occasion where, exasperated with my flinches and 
back-seat driving, my eldest sister silenced me with: ‘you’re no longer Singaporean’! 
Perhaps this is what Croucher (2004, 40) means when she argues that identities are as 
much assigned as they are asserted. In any case, it is only since having been 
summarily stripped of my Singaporean-ness by my sibling that I have had opportunity 
to realise some measure of what that keynote speaker from years ago meant.  
To explain the Singaporean ethos is to describe the experience of growing up 
with friends, working with colleagues and living with neighbours of different 
ethnicities, creeds and origins. The everyday experience of life in Singapore is 
essential to and formative of the Singaporean ethos. Siti, James, Chandra and Wai 
Ling - Malay boss, Eurasian co-worker, Indian corner store owner and Chinese 
classmate - their names, faces, voices, gestures and presence at various stages of life, 
are an intrinsic part of life in Singapore. The ability to make sense of each other 
despite the intersecting differences of age, gender, class, language, religion and 
culture is a large part of that mutual knowing, of recognition. Although it is rare for 
one individual to be fluent in all the four official languages of Singapore—English, 
Chinese, Malay and Tamil—most Singaporeans can converse in Singlish,3 if not 
English, and are able to utter or at least recognise a smattering of each others’ 
languages and dialects.  
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Singlish has developed in a hostile environment engendered and grounded in 
the rationale of economic progress that Singaporeans have all but internalised. The 
State consistently discourages the everyday use of Singlish as it is not easily 
penetrated by outsiders and thus, considered bad for business.4 Its stubborn longevity 
owes something to the genuine need for daily socialisation amongst a population of 
migrants. But it also attests to the existence of resistance, resilience and adaptation to 
situations a là Stratton within the mild-mannered populace. To be certain, there are 
some Singaporeans who have little recourse but to try and pass off Singlish as 
English. Unlike the English-educated middle class, adept at both grammatically 
proper English and Singlish, they have no ‘proper English’ to switch to whenever 
needs must (Chua 2005, 14). Nonetheless, the linguistic dexterity of the middle 
classes does not detract from the fact that Singlish is a practical synthesis of the 
variety of cultures and languages in Singapore. It adapts and adopts not just words 
from Malay, Tamil, Hindi and Chinese dialects like Hokkien and Cantonese but also 
their intonations, humour and connotations. Hence, Singlish is very much the result of 
striving to listen to, understand and live with each other’s differences. Out of a mix of 
languages, accents and sounds, Singaporeans have cobbled together a working lingua 
franca of praxis—Singlish. It both identifies and distinguishes Singaporeans, even 
from their closest neighbours, the Malaysians. 
Attendance to listening is as important as attendance to speaking and voice in 
the cultivation of receptive and open attitudes to difference (Dreher, 2009). The 
frequent, habitual listening to cadences strange and unfamiliar accustoms one to 
difference. The importance of such relaxed familiarity with heterogeneity is not to be 
underestimated as it underlines the immediacy and reciprocity responsible for the air 
of anonymous amity surrounding relations between the people of Singapore. This is 
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not, however, to imply that all is tame and sanguine. Few, for example, can remain 
unmoved by the racket and aromas of obligatory over-night cooking and hand-drums 
(kompang) thumped by well wishers at Malay (Muslim) weddings commonly held at 
the void decks5 of housing estates in space-scarce Singapore. Nor will many admit 
that a weekend suffused in the incessant Buddhist chants typical of Chinese funerals 
held at similar spaces is appealing. But with well over 80% of the population living in 
tightly-spaced, government-subsidised HDB flats (Housing and Development Board, 
Singapore 2008), the sounds of one’s neighbours gargling in the morning, warbling 
karaoke in the evening and ‘washing’ mahjong tiles through the night do intrude at 
will. There is and always has been, as Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong puts it, a need 
to maintain a ‘common space’ (H. L. Lee 2009).   
The point is that the unwanted, often unmediated knowledge of and co-
presence of one’s neighbours is par for the course in the city-state. As with many big 
cities, privacy is a precious luxury afforded by the affluent few. Whilst not literally 
living in each other’s pockets, in tiny 693 square kilometre Singapore, all have had to 
adapt to being repeatedly confronted by the crude intimacies of their fellow residents’ 
lives. Along with the inconveniences, one is left with unrelenting knowledge of the 
nuances that differentiate as well as the steady regard that is the foundation of 
peaceful co-existence.  
This sense of conciliation, the making of space for others, extends beyond the 
physical into the social. A brief study of street and place names in Singapore, for 
example, reveals references drawn from a multitude of languages and cultures, from 
Devonshire and Veerasamy Road to Kandang Kerbau Hospital and the town of Ang 
Mo Kio. This is obviously a consequence of official multiracialism. Yet, to compare 
how far the simple act of reading the Singaporean street directory takes one’s 
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imaginary—from the English and Tamil to Malay and Hokkien cultures—to the 
relatively few indigenous names and places, let alone other cultures, that feature in the 
Australian equivalent is telling of how effectively official multiracialism paves the 
way for everyday multiculturalism. 
The multiplicity of cultures and customs adhered to and present in the 
common, daily life of Singaporeans are an integral part of what Taylor (2004) calls 
their social imaginary. Unquestioned and often taken for granted, these elements of 
knowledge and their layers constitute the tissue of Singaporean society. It is this 
seldom articulated yet shared store of mundane, inside comprehension that allows 
Singaporeans to interact and co-exist peacefully from day to day. Generally speaking, 
Singaporeans have encountered and resolved the major frictions present between them 
with goodwill, with few racially motivated incidents occurring in the years since 
independence in 1965.6 These traits—the making of space, in both the imaginary and 
physical sense—are crucial to Singaporean-ness. Coexistence on such intimate terms 
is embedded in the motley and the banal. Though it arises from conditions fostered by 
official multiracialism, its nature is more ad hoc, unruly and subject to unscripted, 
tacit rules. 
bell hooks writes in belonging (2009, 9) of a ‘sense and sensibility’ that is 
‘deeply informed by the geography of place’, which for her happens to be Kentucky, 
USA. On one level, geography is also paramount in Singapore. As any school-age 
child will inform you, the city-state’s strategic location on the equator, halfway 
between the trade routes running from the West to the East, is instrumental to its 
status as one of the world’s busiest ports. From the period when the monsoons ruled 
sea travel to the present where the limits of fuel-tank capacity and the attraction of 
efficient infrastructural support encourage and entice transporters carrying travellers 
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of all kinds to stopover, stay and settle, geography has been intrinsic to Singapore’s 
destiny and economic success. 
However, geography is not all, and on another level, place in the form of 
nature is secondary in Singapore. On a day-to-day basis, despite its claim to the title 
of the garden city, the vast majority of Singaporeans conduct their lives in artificial, 
man-made environments. Moving from and between air-conditioned buildings, 
vehicles and green areas like pint-sized playgrounds and neat garden strips, nature, 
soil, weather, flora and fauna feature less so in the social imaginary than they would, 
for example, in the expansive landscapes of hooks’ native Kentucky. This is not, of 
course, to aver that one can escape entirely from the vagaries of nature only that in 
congested, densely populated and intense, efficient Singapore, ‘sense and sensibility’ 
are primarily mapped onto and result from immersion in the terrain of social relations.  
Sampling Singapore 
 
Figure 1: Night shopping at the Toa Payoh housing estate, Singapore  Susan Leong, 2009 
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To return to the 2009 trip that triggered this paper, some of the greatest 
pleasures enjoyed then was the sampling of affordable street food and the plentiful 
bargains to be had in the home-ground of Goh Chok Tong’s ‘heartlanders’.7 The 
housing estates of Ang Mo Kio, Toa Payoh and Hougang, were repeatedly visited en 
masse by the entire family. Hawker centres were destinations of choice for breakfast, 
lunch and dinner, followed by the obligatory, postprandial stroll amongst the straggle 
of neighbourhood shops (see Figure 1).  
After multiple outings what struck me was the realisation that Singapore had grown 
markedly more Chinese in character. That is to say, whereas the Chinese have 
always formed the dominant proportion of the local population,8 and Chinese 
cultural symbols lined the streets, the Malay and Indian cultures were also 
present, albeit in different proportions. Also, together with the earlier references 
to Singlish, street and place names, cuisine and attire, one could add the 
common observance of cultural and religious occasions by all. Finally, there 
was always an understanding that in multicultural and meritocratic Singapore, 
English or more accurately, Singlish is the working language for most people. 
Yet, during that recent trip I observed that most sales assistants would try and 
communicate with customers in Mandarin Chinese (henceforth Mandarin) 
before attempting any other language. There is, as Ang (2001) relates, almost 
always an unspoken expectation that if you look even halfway Chinese, you can 
and should speak Mandarin. In part, this can be explained by the high number of 
Mandarin-speaking migrants from mainland and Greater China Singapore has 
attracted in the past 10 years through its explicit “strategic focus” (Mandarin 
will become Singaporean Mother Tongue 2009) on trade with China through the 
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creation of a “China-ready” population (Wong-Anan 2009). This has seen the 
local Chinese population rise from 2.47 million in 2000 (Saw 2007, 29) to 2.79 
million in 2010 (Census of Population 2010). Given it is the only Southeast 
Asian nation with a majority Chinese population, new arrivals from mainland 
and Greater China quite naturally expect to utilise their native language skills 
and encounter familiar customs as well as traditions in Singapore. In itself, this 
is not an unexpected or remarkable consequence. However, in multi-racial 
Singapore, this has certain implications. 
Like many middle-class Chinese Singaporeans, I am fluent in English and fairly 
competent in a second language (Mandarin) as well as a Chinese dialect (Cantonese), 
which my parents, grandparents and great grandparents who emigrated from China 
used at home. However, in comparison to the Mainland Chinese that have arrived 
since the 1980s, postcolonial, second-generation, Chinese Singaporeans are, as Sun 
(2005, 80) points out, only somewhat literate in Mandarin. Hence, Mandarin as 
spoken and used in Singapore is not Mandarin as it is in Mainland China.9 This is 
largely because while Mandarin constitutes a single subject (Mother Tongue) taught 
at school and used by the younger population in social situations outside the home 
(Xu cited in Dixon 2005, 32), dialects like Hokkien and Cantonese have long been the 
main languages of communication in the private sphere. This is likely to remain the 
case with diminishing proportions in coming years as many of the older generation 
are not as if at all fluent in Mandarin. In the meantime, whilst Mandarin is a learnt or 
academic language, it is hardly utilised to the same depth or extent as it is in China. 
Instead, the communication gaps within the diverse local population have habitually 
been breached with the aid of Singlish. So it was to my consternation I found myself 
not only struggling to communicate in what used to be home but also, in one instance, 
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chided for having tried to do so in Singlish rather than Mandarin. It is hard to imagine 
how the non-Chinese speaking in Singapore would react, but a growing sense of 
unease in the general population is finding voice (see also Mak 2009; Loh 2009):  
[w]hy is it increasingly difficult to order in English in some Chinese 
restaurants and shops? Why is it that in some, perhaps many offices, staff 
seem to speak more Mandarin than English among themselves? Why is it 
that a new ‘language’ is emerging in Singapore, Mandarin-English or 
perhaps we can call it Manglish, which is really spoken Mandarin 
interspersed with English every now and then? (Samuel Owen, Reader’s 
Comment, AsiaOne, 16 July 2009) 
It says much of the depth of habits of thought ingrained through indoctrination 
that despite the years of enforced independence in Australia, my own immediate 
response was to turn to the paternalistic authority of the State for an explanation. It 
seemed then as it still does now that the famed social engineers of the nation, the 
government of Singapore must be aware of what they are doing in encouraging the 
encroaching sinicisation of Singapore. After all, the spectre of Chinese chauvinism 
was one reason forwarded, in the early days of the city-state’s independence, for 
shutting down the vocal Chinese language media and bringing the clans and 
communities that had established themselves under the aegis of the British 
administration into the fold of the then newly formed State (Chua 2005, 9–10).  
There now seems to be an about-face in train. From the Minister Mentor, Lee 
Kuan Yew, 10 onwards, everyone is expounding on how being Chinese has its 
usefulness (‘Interview: Singapore’s Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew hails China-
ASEAN ties’ 2007). Many intersecting conditions play a role in the preponderance of 
the Chinese culture in Singapore: the large volume of migrants from China, the 
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existent cultural similarities derived of the local Chinese population, and the rise of 
China as an economic power in the world as well as the region. It would be 
disingenuous to think Singapore is the only nation trying to establish some kind of 
grasp on the runaway bandwagon of Chinese economic expansion. And even more 
foolish to consider that Singapore can afford to refrain from taking advantage of the 
benefits ‘cultural proximity’ (Iwabuchi 2002, 130) appears to hand its predominantly 
Chinese population. Just as the former Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, 
attempted to parlay his Mandarin-speaking skills to some political benefit, 
Singapore’s government has been urging its citizens to ‘speak good Mandarin and 
take advantage of the opportunities China presents’ (Kor 2009). Such instrumentalism 
is evidenced in the long-running Speak Mandarin Campaign (SMC), which has since 
1990 emphasized Mandarin language skills as an important economic asset in relation 
to trade with China (Teo 2005, 125). So much so that between 1998 and 2000, the 
slogan for the SMC was “Speak Mandarin, It’s an Asset” (ibid 129).  
Discussions on online forums (http://www.asiaone.com) provide some inkling 
of the wider Singaporean public’s responses. Unsurprisingly, since Singaporeans have 
a well-publicised liking for acronyms, a new one, FT (foreign talent), had been coined 
by the government to denote the migrants who originate from Mainland China and 
elsewhere (Low 2002). What the discussion threads reveal is a considerable level of 
resentment among ‘born-and-bred Singaporeans’ at the FTs snatching jobs and 
benefits from the hands of Singaporeans without committing to local citizenship; this 
antipathy stretches all the way back to 2000 and earlier (Chng 2000).11  
A comparison of population statistics from 1998 and 2008 lends some credence 
to their concerns: the proportion of citizens is diminishing even as the population of 
residents is growing (figures derived from those available on Population in Brief 
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2008, 15). In the current context of economic recession, there is also substantial 
cynicism as to the necessity for and level of talent that is being recruited into the 
country. According to Low (2003, 420), these sentiments are most prevalent among 
the older, less mobile and local ‘fallen talents’ of the post-war baby boomers who 
perceive themselves to have been nudged out of employment by the presence of these 
non-citizens. Correspondingly, there is much anxiety, even amongst those who have 
taken up Singaporean citizenship, about the wisdom of their decisions (Li 2009). The 
State, however, remains adamant that global foreign talents are vital to Singapore’s 
vision of becoming a ‘global city’ (Chong 2003).  
None of this is especially novel and one can discern within the rhetoric the 
outlines of a familiar pattern—one most recently evidenced during the 1980s when 
the Singaporean State was constantly encouraging its citizens to adopt the Japanese 
style of management (Chong & Jain 1987, 76 & 83) and learn Japanese,12 even as 
neighbouring Malaysia was rolling out its ‘Look East’ policy (Furuoka 2007). The 
formula that propelled Singapore from third to first-world status is simply being 
reapplied. According to its succession of able administrators, the ‘Singapore [success] 
Story’ is that of a vulnerable, tiny nation with a lamentable lack of natural resources 
that cannot survive without the sustained efforts of its population (Tan 2007, 296ff). 
At every opportunity, this is the perennial theme the State and its ministers reiterate: 
the only resource Singapore can lay claim to is human; hence Singaporeans must 
strive to build up, improve and adapt to whatever (economic) winds prevail in order to 
survive (see H. L. Lee 2008). For this reason, the government argues, the continued 
inward flow of migrants is essential. In his 1997, 1998 and 2001 National Day rally 
speeches, then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong even took pains to emphasise that the 
Foreign Talent Policy was not limited to top-rung positions (Low, 415) but ‘a matter 
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of life and death’, vital to the Nation’s continued survival (Fernandez 2001; Latif 
2001).  
Chinese by Fractions 
In more recent times, reassurances to placate those disgruntled by FTs include 
promises to make a ‘“sharper” differentiation’ in the treatment of permanent residents 
and citizens (Chia 2009). Yet the impulse to cleave to what is thriving seems 
irresistible, especially when seemingly primordial notions such as that of Greater 
China fuel it further. Though historically a term coined based on the binary notions of 
China Proper and Outer China, as a concept Greater China has in recent times grown 
to incorporate a sense of ‘economic integration, cultural interaction and political 
reunification’ in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Singapore (Harding 1993, 661–2). 
The resurgence of pride in all things Chinese also has some of its roots in the Middle 
Kingdom’s mixed fortunes. Once deferred to by vassals, China was courted by other 
nations keen to trade, before communism took over, then stagnated economically and 
culturally while the rest of the world passed it by (Spence 1999). In the time since 
Deng Xiaoping declared China open for business again in 1978 (Yeh 1997), the 
nation has taken great strides, powering into capitalism at full tilt and taking many 
other more established, first-world economies by storm by virtue of its massive 
population and its seemingly insatiable hunger for economic progress. So impressive 
is the steep rise of China’s economy, the rest of the world is understandably gripped 
with an urgent need to be part of its latest revolution. With Lee Kuan Yew boldly 
declaring to Singaporean Chinese that ‘[i]n two generations, Mandarin will become 
our mother tongue’ (Mandarin will become Singaporean Mother Tongue 2009), 
Singapore seems perfectly poised to plunge into the warm embrace of Greater China. 
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Who belongs to this pan-Chinese diaspora, Greater China? How many 
generations removed can one be before losing membership? A snatch of conversation 
with my 21-year old niece in Singapore about her boyfriend returns: 
Me: So, is he Chinese or what? 
My niece: Yah, pure Chinese. 
In Australia, the expression ‘pure Chinese’ is less common than ‘full Chinese’. One is 
left inevitably with the notion of a half, quarter, one-eighth and so forth Chinese, a 
concept not that distant from the racist terms of mulatto, quadroon and octoroon, 
complete with implied assumption of a purity of blood that has been tainted and 
diluted through miscegenation. China-born Australian poet Ouyang Yu reflects a 
similar attitude in his poem, The Least Chinese (2010). For Ouyang, though their (the 
Australian-born Chinese) ‘skin [is] forever Chinese’ their hearts and minds are always 
‘twice removed‘ because they were ‘born and bred in oz’ and cannot speak Chinese. 
Full or pure Chinese, the notion that there are degrees of Chinese-ness is persistent.  
Zeleza (cited in Makalani 2009, 2) writes of the plasticity and vagueness of the 
term ‘African’ and the uncertainty as to whether it is a racial and spatial referent. The 
same can be said of the term ‘Chinese’. There are two imbricated assumptions at work 
in insistence on racial purity. The first is that all those of Chinese descent are 
somehow Chinese by default. A large part of this assumption is owed to the long-
running principle of jus sanguinis adopted by China that was repealed only as recently 
as 1955 (Mansingh 1991, 317–318). This is the underlying notion buried within the 
seemingly innocuous phrase ‘full Chinese’. The belief in an uninterrupted racial 
continuity is complicated by its intersections with an unbroken spatial connection and 
encapsulated in the concept of diaspora—that is, a people displaced from their 
homeland, their place of origin. The two intermingled ideas are problematic but both 
16 
are frequently conflated in popular imaginaries and discussions of the overseas 
Chinese. 
To continue with Ouyang’s terminology, who is most Chinese? Would a 
person who speaks Mandarin be considered more Chinese than the one who speaks 
only Chinese dialects? Is a person of Chinese descent brought up and educated in the 
West less Chinese than one born, raised and living in China? Is one more Chinese if 
residing geographically closer to mainland China, say, in Malaysia rather than 
Australia? What tacit list of qualities defines a pure Chinese? Who, ultimately, is the 
arbiter of that list?  
The overall tenor of everyday life in contemporary Singapore is changing, 
becoming increasingly Chinese in tone and character. As mainland and Greater 
Chinese migrants come to comprise even more of Singapore society, new social 
practices like the previously mentioned acceptance of Mandarin as the lingua franca 
are also being introduced. At the same time, by sheer weight of their presence these 
migrants also readjust customs that have acquired a more local, hybrid flavour in 
equatorial Singapore. One example is the highly elaborate celebration of Chinese New 
Year as the Spring Festival, which nowadays sees great volumes of festive products, 
content and trends are imported from China. As these goods are manufactured for a 
Mandarin-literate market, much of the symbolism is lost on those who do not read the 
language. The risk, then, is that non-Chinese Singaporeans would be cut off and 
distanced from an event that they have gradually become a part of. Whilst it is 
unlikely that Malays and Indians will entirely adopt the festival as their own, many do 
celebrate alongside the Chinese, partaking in the congeniality of customs like visiting 
each other’s homes during the happy season. 
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The prospect of Singapore losing its multiethnic, multicultural character must 
be squarely faced. Yet the solution lies not in the demand that those originating from 
Mainland China or elsewhere for that matter should drop all their cultural traits at the 
border, learn to speak Singlish and assimilate into Singapore. Such demands are 
futile, for the cultural transitions that presage naturalisation cannot be demanded or 
commanded. It is my argument that official multiracialism in Singapore has allowed 
its people to enjoy a level of familiarity and ease with difference, which Stratton 
(1998) dubs everyday multiculturalism. However, in a reality organised around 
nation-states, the continuance of everyday multiculturalism cannot be left to 
happenstance. The issue at stake for Singapore is one of bringing about an 
appreciation and awareness of the inclusive, multi-ethnic tone and character of 
Singaporean culture even as shifts continue to occur within the terrain of social 
relations. More broadly, it is a question of ensuring the continuity of that sensibility 
towards multiplicity that might be irretrievably lost if Singapore rushes towards being 
part of Greater China. 
As the Singapore government makes obvious, there are economic benefits that 
can accrue from a mainland-centred and directed sense of Chinese-ness. Even as the 
authorities argue for the necessity of this market-driven logic, the local population’s 
growing resentment at the inflow of migrants speaks of the risk such policies pose for 
the island-state (Singapore needs young immigrants 2011). In the past couple of years, 
the Singaporean government has responded to complaints through a fine-tuneing of 
immigration policies to limit the number of Singapore Permanent Residents and 
Citizens. It has also promised to preserve “distinct and unique aspects of Singapore”, 
giving cause to believe that the changes described above have not gone unnoticed by 
either the State or its inhabitants (Chee 2011).  There is reason to believe, then, that 
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within Singapore, the pluralist sense of Chinese-ness that strives to include will be 
preserved over a narrow, purist one, however defined by whatever tacit list.  
Impoverished of natural resources and geographically miniscule, it seems 
apparent Singapore is constantly under threat and thus, in need of bigger, stronger 
allies for survival. The same discourse was emphasised by Lee Kuan Yew as recently 
as 2009 through a highly public exchange of words sparked by Nominated Member of 
Parliament (NMP)13 Viswa Sadasivan’s maiden speech in Parliament. In his 
controversial exhortation to Parliament, Sadasivan called on the government of 
Singapore to abide by the egalitarian ‘nation building tenets enshrined in the Nation 
Pledge’ (Sadasivan 2009). Written in 1966 by then Deputy Prime Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, and recited daily by thousands of students at the 
start of every school day, the Singapore National Pledge reads: 
We, the citizens of Singapore 
pledge ourselves as one united people, 
regardless of race, language or religion, 
to build a democratic society 
based on justice and equality, 
so as to achieve  
happiness, prosperity and progress for our nation.  
This ritual of mass affirmation is usually accompanied by the national anthem, 
Majulah Singapura (Onward Singapore), composed and sung still in Malay, the 
language indigenous to the region. The will towards nation-building is blatantly clear 
as is the intention to instil values in young Singaporeans through the daily, ceremonial 
repetition of what is largely a creed. Yet, Sadasivan’s advocacy of justice and equality 
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was met with a response that swiftly demolished any immediate hope of such a 
levelling taking form.  
Delivered with great authority by the Minister Mentor the rebuttal consisted of 
two parts (K. Y. Lee, 2009). The first is the crushing assertion that the government 
has ‘a duty not to treat everybody as equal’ because Malay paramountacy is written 
into Singapore’s Constitution.14 The rationale is deeply flawed because it mistakes 
attempts to recognise and redress the ‘structural disadvantages’ that minorities are 
subject to with unequal treatment (Sa’at 2009) but that is perhaps an issue best left to 
another day. The second explanation rationalises that as a nation still ‘[i]n transition’, 
it will be some time before Singapore is ready to live up to the aspirations of its 
national pledge and ‘high-falutin ideas’ like egalitarianism (K. Y. Lee 2009). Ideals, it 
seems, are only for those who can afford them.  
Are the entrenched anxieties surrounding survival embedded in the Singaporean 
psyche sufficient reason to ignore the needs of the disadvantaged? Like all modern 
nations Singapore is a construction in progress, however, deprived of an awe-
inspiring landscape, ancient history or any of the usual symbols of a shared common 
language, religion and ancestry that nations mythologise and cohere around, the 
prosaic activities of everyday life is the arena where the sense and sensibilities of 
Singaporean-ness are tested, formed and recast. The processes of accommodation and 
resistance, and their novel solutions, comprise the lived experience of being 
Singaporean. To underestimate and undermine the importance of this ethos and the 
ideals intrinsic to them is to court disaster.  
Conclusion 
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The longing for rootedness, as Weil (1952) puts it, is as essential to humans as food, 
shelter and clothing, but it cannot spring from the pointless search for what is already 
past. In this final answer to the initial query posed more than a dozen years ago: no, I 
have not assimilated but Australia is home. Nonetheless, when questioned about 
Australia, I am deeply aware that large sections of Australian society persist with the 
‘“White” nation fantasy’ where the Nation is understood as ‘a space structured around 
a White culture’ (Hage 1998, 18). On these terms, the dominance of White culture is 
non-negotiable and all those of other cultures who wish to be part of Australia must 
recognise and assimilate into the core culture (Stratton 1998). It is this insistence that 
drives the actions and insistence of individuals like Matthew Wayne Tweedy of the 
anti-immigration Australian Protectionist Party (Adshead 2009), white supremacist 
groups like the Southern Cross Hammerskins (Glennie 2010) and the immigration 
policies of ex-Prime Minister John Howard (Stratton 1998).  
The fact that of the top ten countries of birth of those who settled in Australia 
between 2007 and 2008, eight are Asian (‘Face the Facts’ 2008) serves both to 
exacerbate the strident demands of the above parties and argue for the futility of their 
task. What may result is by no means a foregone conclusion but I contend that the 
experience of inhabiting a space amongst others of a different ilk, with the attendant 
need to be understood, make a living and co-exist, in and of itself sets into motion a 
process that creates and embodies its own set of cultural dynamics.  
I am convinced that we are as much where as how we live. That is to say, as 
human beings we absorb and draw on the social imaginaries in which we have been 
immersed and of which we are part (Taylor 2004). Ang (2001, 30), citing Gilroy 
contends that ‘for the migrant it is no longer ‘where you’re from’, but ‘where you’re 
at’ which forms the point of anchorage’. I would add that who I am is not only a 
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function of where I live but also where I will live for emigration is nothing if not the 
embodiment of aspiration, whether that is the prospect of safety from persecution, 
improved economic prospects and broader educational opportunities or a better 
lifestyle. Migrants are almost always deeply motivated and hence, anchored by what 
they hope for the future. 
In the awareness that the world consists of many cultures, each distinct from 
but capable of co-existence, I am more Singaporean than I was ever Chinese. This 
condition of awareness was bred in me through the circumstance of growing up in 
Singapore. The lived reality of multiethnic co-existence is innate to the formation of 
my sense and sensibilities. Structured and shaped by policy and adapted to, lived and 
experienced multiculturalism is what has defined Singapore so far. Whether this 
continues to be the case is not a matter that can be settled here. However, without 
wanting to paint the issue in the hues of nostalgia, I am no longer of Singapore, for 
the time and space that gave rise to that sense and sensibility no longer fully exists in 
its present incarnation. In light of contemporary Singapore, the nation that appears to 
be losing sight of its pluralist ethos, I am, as my sibling charged, no longer 
Singaporean. 
Is it possible, then, to lay claim to the hyphenated, hybrid category of Chinese-
Australian; a Chinese, as Beth Yahp puts it, ’with tags‘? (Yahp cited in Shen 2001, 
125). The notion that there are degrees of Chinese-ness is stubborn. Would it better to 
frame one’s identity as evolving around a core? The notion titillates and the awkward 
Singaporean-Australian, Asian-Australian, Australian-Chinese tags loom as 
possibilities. However, I doubt one could maintain a stable, unchanging core any 
more than one could remain impervious to external influences. The layers of one’s 
self accumulate but they also seep into each other and work their way into one’s core 
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to anchor the self in a seething, heaving mass that is somehow, paradoxically, 
cohesive and whole. No hyphens or double-barrelled qualified labels can begin to 
explain the multiplicity of contemporary identities.  
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Notes 
1 For more detail, look at Chua Beng Huat, Racial-Singaporeans: Absence after the 
Hyphen, 1998 and Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in 
Singapore 1995. 
2 This policy has been relaxed and gradually broadened in recent years to allow for 
greater diversity (Dixon 2009, 120). 
3 Singlish is English as spoken by many Singaporeans. It incorporates words and 
idioms from Malay, Chinese, dialects and to a lesser extent, languages like Sikh and 
Tamil. 
4 See for example the ‘Speak Good English’ Movement 
(http://www.goodenglish.org.sg/2009/#top), which has been running since 2000. 
5 This term describes the empty space at the ground floor of housing development 
flats in Singapore. Considered a communal space, its usage is administered centrally 
by the town council, which often hires it out for events as varied as weddings and 
funerals. 
6 Prior to 1965, when Singapore was still part of Malaya, there is a period known as 
The Emergency (1948-1960) where mostly Chinese pro-communists led an 
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insurgency against the then British administration. Two race riots also occurred in 
1964. Memories of these events and threat of racial disharmony are still used today to 
justify the laws enacted in response then, like the Internal Security Act (ISA).  
7 Singapore’s Prime Minister from 1990 to 2004, Goh Chok Tong, used the term 
‘heartlanders’ to denote the majority of Singapore’s population who are less affluent, 
educated and who live mostly in government-subsidised housing estates. 
8 The Chinese comprise 2.7 million of Singapore’s 4.8 million population (Population 
in Brief 2008). 
9 The Speak Mandarin Campaign (SMC) was implemented alongside the bilingual 
educational policy in 1979 and has been running continuously since then (Teo 2005). 
The SMC’s primary aim has always been to utilise Mandarin as a uniting (as well as 
homogenising) factor across the disparate dialect-speaking Chinese communities in 
Singapore, which have a historical tendency to self-organise along ethno-linguistic 
lines (Kuhn 2008, 347). 
10 The former Prime Minister of Singapore now sits in government as the Minister 
Mentor, (MM). His son, Lee Hsien Loong, is the current Prime Minister. 
11 See for example, It’s Singapore, serve us in English first, please at 
http://forums.asiaone.com/showthread.php?t=10827&page=40#396 (accessed 8 
January 2011). 
12 Japanese remains one of seven ‘third languages’ that can be taken up by the top 
10% of every graduating primary school cohort at school as a subject. The others are 
Malay, Chinese, Bahasa Indonesia, Arabic, French and German (Language 
Programmes 2011). 
13 NMPs are a unique paradox of the Singapore Parliament and style of democracy. 
Introduced in 1990 to ‘provide for alternative views and constructive dissent in the 
31 
                                                                                                                                       
House’ and raise ‘the quality of debate in Parliament’ NMPs are not elected but 
nominated representatives of specific interest groups that are themselves designated 
by the government in power (Hussain 2009). 
14 For details, see Article 152, Minorities and Special Position of the Malays, on 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-
CONST&doctitle=CONSTITUTION%20OF%20THE%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20SI
NGAPORE%0A&date=latest&method=part. 
